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1 Bill  Clinton  did  not  seek  the  presidency  to  initiate  an  activist  foreign  policy  in  the
aftermath  of  the  Cold  War,  but  instead  to  champion  domestic  affairs  and  economic
renewal.  However,  his  foreign  policy  advisers  entered  office  with  their  own,  often
differing, interpretations of the United States’ position in the post-Cold War era. After the
unity  demonstrated  by  the  Gulf  War,  the  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations
advocated  a  tactic  of  Assertive  Multilateralism  with  which  to  provide  international
leadership. This acknowledged President George H.W. Bush’s approach to foreign policy
and was viewed as a way to reduce costs, casualties and American exposure in overseas
deployments. Despite these hopes, Assertive Multilateralism did not prevail – why was
this  the  case?  Twenty  years  on,  this  paper  analyses  the  concept  of  Assertive
Multilateralism, and specifically, the challenges posed to its continued implementation by
the Somali mission. The paper finds that unrealistic mission expectations, the prioritizing
of domestic agendas, and an inability to control the mission narrative all contributed to
cause a fundamental shift in the United States’  implementation of foreign policy and
raised doubts  over  its  continued commitment  to  the United Nations.  Ultimately,  the
events in Somalia ensured that foreign policy become a tool with which to attack an
administration focused on domestic affairs and unwilling to expend political capital on
overseas operations.
2 Given the historic  junction at  which the Clinton Administration came to power it  is
surprising  that  more  has  not  been  written  on  its  foreign  policy  initiatives.  Nancy
Soderberg noted in 2005 “no insider of the Clinton White House has discussed the broad
challenges involving the use of force and diplomacy faced by the administration.” Such a
pattern  continues,  with  no  former  Clinton  official  having  adequately  addressed  the
administration’s  development  of  foreign policy.  Accordingly,  the administration risks
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being viewed as merely the age ‘between the Bushes’, between a Cold War and a War on
Terror. However, President Clinton’s time in office coincided with historic global events
and his handling of them was crucial to the development of world politics at the dawn of
the twenty-first century. A consideration of policy documents and interviews with former
members of the Clinton national security team reveal an administration seeking to define
America’s role in the rapidly changing world.1 As Richard Sale notes, “the popular image
of Bill  Clinton as a foreign policy leader is  one of  a man who was tardy,  vacillating,
irresolute, always timidly reluctant to use force and heading an administration lacking in
singleness  of  focus  or  ruthlessness  of  drive.”2 Only by attempting to  understand the
efforts of the Clinton Administration to address the challenges of the post-Cold War era
and devise policy with which to address it, can we hope to comprehend the reasoning
behind the actions of his successors, both of whom inherited Clinton-era policies and
practices, including the rejection of Assertive Multilateralism.
3 Although the term ‘Assertive Multilateralism’ is credited to Madeline Albright it was a
philosophy of international leadership that the Clinton Administration inherited from
the previous Bush White House. Under George H. W. Bush, the United States had led
United Nations’  multilateral  operations  to  oust  Saddam Hussein  from Kuwait  and to
relieve hunger in Somalia. These missions had lent credence to Bush’s concept of a New
World Order.  Such an approach to foreign policy owed much to the character of the
president as well as to timing. George H. W. Bush was by nature a team player who had
developed relations with heads of state and foreign dignitaries since his days as U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. and as Director of Central Intelligence. He was, therefore, well
positioned to lead a multilateral coalition and maximize the historical timing associated
with the collapse of the U.S.S.R. For most of its existence, the United Nations had been
stymied  by  the  Cold  War  stalemate,  but  with  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  system,  an
opportunity beckoned for the U.N.  to fulfill  its original mandate.  The United Nations
appeared to offer a new vehicle for international operations in the 1990s that enabled the
United States to lead from the front, whilst reducing its defense expenditure as part of a
much anticipated peace dividend. During the 1991 Gulf War and initially in Somalia, this
was a bi-partisan model  for foreign policy,  advocated by a Republican President and
endorsed by a Democratic Congress. It was an approach to policy that Bush’s successor
intended to continue, with every expectation of continued bi-partisan support. 
4 When  Bill  Clinton  succeeded  President  Bush,  he  named  Madeleine  Albright  as  U.S.
Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations.  A  member  of  Jimmy  Carter’s  National  Security
Council,  Albright had spent the 1980s as a faculty member at Georgetown University,
developing the concepts that she would later christen ‘Assertive Multilateralism.’3 Her
concept was that if the United States no longer had the political will nor the resources to
act as a global policeman, it was in America’s interests to form coalitions to do so. It
meant, “that when America acted with others, [America] should lead in establishing goals
and ensuring success.”4 Vitally, however, this did not preclude unilateral action in self-
defense  or  in  defense  of  vital  interests.  Albright  was  adamant  that  Assertive
Multilateralism was a tactic not a goal and was, therefore, an acceptance of President
Bush’s actions in the 1991 Gulf War. Accordingly, it was an approach that should have
received strong bi-partisan support. However, the Somali mission was the last gasp of the
internationalist Republican generation as personified by President Bush, whose approach
to policy implementation had garnered Republican support in Congress, but which came
under attack once it was adopted by the Clinton Administration. Richard Nixon referred
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to Assertive Multilateralism as “naïve gobbledygook.”5 Clinton’s critics attacked the tactic
as  ideologically  driven  and  interpreted  the  phrase  to  imply  that  the  administration
intended  to  subcontract  U.S.  foreign  policy  to  the  United  Nations.  The  Clinton
Administration, they claimed, believed “American unilateralism was the principal sin to
be avoided, as if to atone for a shameful past.”6 Albright, however, insisted to a House
subcommittee as late as June 1993 that Assertive Multilateralism was in America’s best
interests.7 Soon, however, the administration was forced to explain where U.S. interests
lay in Somalia. 
5 The  plight  of  the  Somali  people  became  apparent  to  the  world  during  1992,  whilst
America’s attention was on the presidential campaign.8 On the few occasions that foreign
policy was addressed, Somalia was not considered a priority when contrasted with crises
evolving in  Bosnia,  the  former Soviet  Union,  China,  Haiti,  the  Middle  East  and Iraq.
Despite the lack of attention on the campaign, on April 24, the United States approved
U.N. Resolution 751, establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (U.N.O.S.O.M.)
and provided almost half of the emergency relief materials.9 These efforts, however, were
severely  hampered  as  relief  flights  were  looted,  food  convoys  hijacked  and  workers
assaulted,  causing  questions  to  be  asked  in  Congress  about  the  potential  for  direct
military action.10 The unwillingness of the United States to dispatch troops to aid the
humanitarian effort undermined President Bush’s concept of a ‘New World Order,’ but
the  administration’s  inaction  owed  much  to  domestic  politics  and  electoral  timing.
Throughout  the  1992  campaign  George  H.W.  Bush  was  forced  to  act  in  response  to
allegations that he was a ‘foreign policy president’ with little regard for the economic
woes of the country. Once his plans for a second term had been thwarted, he returned to
the multilateral approach to foreign policy that had been at the heart of his presidency.
On December 9, 1992, the first American troops landed in Somalia under the auspices of
Security  Council  Resolution  794,  as  U.N.O.S.O.M.  gave  way  to  United  Task  Force
(U.N.I.T.A.F.), codenamed Operation Restore Hope. Between December 1992 and March
1993, U.N.I.T.A.F. saved countless lives in Somalia and delivered supplies to those in need.
The short-term aspects of the plan succeeded, enabling the U.S. commitment to end, as
U.N. Resolution 814 concluded the U.N.I.T.A.F. mission and gave rise to U.N.O.S.O.M.II.11
This reduced the American force from 25,000 to just 1,100 rapid reaction troops and 3,000
logistical  support  personnel.  The American withdrawal,  however,  emboldened Somali
warlords,  including  General  Mohammed  Aidiid,  who  targeted  the  multinational
peacekeeping force, resulting in the deaths of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. On October 3,
1993,  Task  Force  Ranger,  an  American  Special  Forces  unit  dispatched  specifically  to
apprehend Aidiid, became embroiled in a mission that should have taken no longer than
an hour but dragged on throughout the night, as two Black Hawk helicopters were lost.
The ensuing battle cost 18 American lives in the worst single day for battlefield casualties
of the entire Clinton Presidency. It caused the abandonment of Assertive Multilateralism
as  a  model  of  policy  implementation,  the  eventual  departure  of  the  U.N.  Secretary
General and led to a reappraisal of the use of the United Nations by the United States in
future overseas ventures.
6 Why  did  this  happen?  Similar  events  in  Vietnam  and  subsequently  in  Iran  and
Afghanistan failed to cause such a reversal in policy.12 Why then, did these casualty rates,
which were in line with overall expectations, cause such a fundamental shift in direction?
The explanation is contained in a series of flaws inherent in the Somali  mission, the
failure of two administrations to prioritize Somalia at the expense of domestic affairs and
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the Clinton Administration’s inability to control the narrative of the mission in a rapidly
changing geo-political  landscape.  These elements  contributed to  ensure not  only  the
failure  of  an  otherwise  successful  operation  in  Somalia,  but  also  the  demise  of  an
otherwise successful tactic of Assertive Multilateralism.
 
1.1 Mission Flaws
7 The model for Assertive Multilateralism was the 1991 Gulf War, initiated to repel Iraqi
forces from Kuwait. This was a clearly defined mission with defined operational limits.
Once these were achieved the mission ended. Despite the success in the Gulf, the Somali
operation proved to be a very different mission, in which unrealistic expectations proved
to be critical. The key elements that made an assertive multilateral tactic a success in the
1991 Gulf War were absent in the design of the Somali mission. The planning was too
truncated; the decision to deploy was based on emotion not logic and the United States
did  not  retain  control  of  the  mission as  the  operation’s  parameters  were  altered to
incorporate the ambitions of the United Nation’s Secretary General. These flaws in the
design  of  the  Somali  mission  contributed  to  undermine  the  continued  feasibility  of
Assertive Multilateralism.
8 First, truncated planning was a contributing factor in the failure of the Somalia mission,
which compromised the deployment and led to doubts over the viability of Assertive
Multilateralism.  On  November  20,  1992  the  National  Security  Council’s  Deputies
Committee began a series of four meetings on Somali at which Under Secretary of Defense
Paul  Wolfowitz suggested deploying ground troops.  Five days later,  on November 25,
President Bush decided that U.S.  combat troops should lead an international force to
Somalia.13Famine and disease were claiming up to 1,000 Somali lives a day but the White
House claimed it could establish order and be out by Bush’s last day in office, January 20,
1993.14 The  Pentagon demurred,  believing  that  the  operation  could take  at  least  six
months. Defense Secretary Cheney advised the president, “we can’t have it both ways. We
can’t get in there fully until mid-December. And the job won’t be done by January 19.”15
The president,  however,  initiated  the  deployment  despite  objections  from his  senior
military  advisers.  The  out-going team conceded that  the  Clinton Administration was
being handed “a difficult situation” as the withdrawal of the American contingent before
Inauguration Day was now considered “unrealistic.”16 The operation was initiated only
after the president had lost his bid for re-election, decided upon in four rapidly held
meetings at the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council, implemented with
little time for a consultation with Congress and the mission’s timescale was in flux before
the troops had been dispatched.17 The planning and preparation that had defined an
assertive, multilateral approach in the build up to the 1991 Gulf War were clearly lacking
in this instance.  
9 Also absent was a rational reason for intervention as policy makers relied on emotion and
ignored  pragmatic  advice.  In  1991  an  assertive  multilateral  approach  had  succeeded
because nations recognized the potential threat created by a policy of appeasement in the
Persian Gulf and the threat that this posed to oil supplies. No such explanation existed to
justify the decision to deploy in Somalia. Instead, the decision was based on emotion in a
classic example of what became known as ‘the CNN effect’;  an emotional response to
images of starving Somalis compelled President Bush to support the U.N. mission and a
similar  reaction  to  images  of  murdered  American  troops  led  to  the  end  of  U.S.
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involvement the following year.18 Between these two events emotion continued to play a
role in the Clinton Administration’s approach to the mission as key advisers pursued a
quintessential American liberal tradition at the expense of pragmatism.      
10 As President Bush’s final multilateral mission had crept into a subsequent administration
without having devised an exit strategy, the incoming Clinton foreign policy team was
forced to develop an ad hoc strategy to deal with the situation. Dick Moose, designated
Under-Secretary of State for Management, was tasked with devising a Presidential Study
Di rective (P.S.D.) examining options in Somalia. He recommended withdrawal. However,
when this blunt report received a muted response from Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger,
19 “he suspected he was saying something that they did not want to hear.” 20 Lake and
Berger were proponents of a humanitarian led foreign policy and feared that Moose’s
suggestion  may  return  Somalia  to  its  previous  state  of  anarchy.  Such  action  was
anathema to the two men, who both valued the American liberal tradition of trying to
export goodwill and a better life to the Third World. Lake in particular had a special
interest in the plight of Africa and was committed to the operation’s completion. Moose’s
advice, however, should have been heeded, as events in Somalia became the nadir of
foreign intervention for the entire Clinton presidency. 
11 In making policy based on emotion, the out-going Bush national security team ensured
that the Somali operation was flawed from the beginning. Their actions meant that the
Clinton Administration,  so determined to focus on the domestic  renewal  of  America,
assumed office with 25,000 troops deployed in an ill conceived, rapidly executed mission.
This was compounded by the emotional, ideological determination of key members of the
Clinton Administration to reject pragmatic policy options and pursue a policy that bore
no resemblance to anything that had been espoused on the campaign trail, and which had
no place in their Grand Strategy policy that eventually emerged. The reliance on emotion
ensured that lessons from the previous successful adoption of an assertive multilateral
approach  were  ignored  as  the  United  States  surrendered  control  of  the  mission  in
Somalia. 
12 In 1991, the United States took the lead in the implementation of the U.N. mission to
expel Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. The U.S. had taken an assertive, multilateral
approach and led a coalition to achieve its stated goals. Once these had been completed,
the mission ended. In Somalia, the mission appeared to have succeeded by spring 1993.
This  led  the  United States  to  hand over  operational  command and to  withdraw the
majority  of  its  forces  as  U.N.I.T.A.F.  morphed into  U.N.O.S.O.M.II  on  May  4,  1993.
However, this was the latest in a series of hastily made decisions regarding the Somali
operation.  The Clinton Administration had endorsed Security Council  Resolution 814,
which authorized the  U.N.  to  rebuild  Somalia,  as  it  enabled the  withdrawal  of  most
American  troops.  It  had,  however,  meant  that  a  small  number  of  American  forces
remained in Somalia and that the U.S. was no longer in control of the mission parameters,
which had changed considerably. Leaving personnel in Somalia ensured that the United
States retained a lingering commitment to a mission that was of no importance to the
administration. The mission remained multilateral at this point, but U.S. involvement was
anything but assertive. Retaining a commitment, however small, guaranteed that what
was initiated under Resolution 814 became associated with the Clinton Administration,
despite the lead taken on the issue by the U.N. Secretary General, Dr Boutros Boutros-
Ghali,  whose personality and commitment to social  engineering led to a  shift  in the
mission parameters and to the final key flaw in the mission plan.   
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13 By the Secretary General’s design, U.N.O.S.O.M.II utilized expanded enforcement power
and  included  a  mandate  to  disarm  Somali  factions.  The  new  mission went  beyond
providing humanitarian relief and committed the U.N. to stabilizing Somalia, restoring
law  and  order,  creating  an  infrastructure  and  helping  to  establish  representative
government. Under Resolution 814, therefore, the United Nations attempted to build a
new nation from the ruins of Somalia. It was this concept of Nation Building that proved
to be contentious and so detrimental to the Clinton Administration. However, this was a
United Nations’  policy  and was  neither initiated  nor  imposed by  the  White  House.21
Indeed,  as  the  transition  to  U.N.O.S.O.M.II  ensured  that  American  forces  were  cut
substantially, and because the operation was going to plan, few in Washington voiced
concern.  Even  the  House  of  Representatives,  which  presented  many  subsequent
challenges to the foreign policy endeavors of the Clinton White House, decisively passed a
resolution “endorsing the nation building mission and favoring the use  of  American
troops to support it, for several years if necessary.”22 Such endorsements were quickly
forgotten  following  the  American  deaths  in  Somalia,  as  the  recriminations  poisoned
relations between Washington and the U.N.  in the years that followed.  However,  the
Somali mission was never a priority of the Clinton White House and had been inherited
from the previous Bush Administration. Nation Building was a goal of the U.N. and was
endorsed by the Clinton Administration and Congress only once the majority of American
troops had been withdrawn.23 This  was clarified in a letter President Clinton sent to
Congress in which he spelt out his position: “We went to Somalia on a humanitarian
mission…The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of nation building.”24
This was not a policy that could be used to justify any American fatalities, and meant the
events  in  Somalia  ended  any  hopes  of  relying  on  the  U.N.  to  handle  future  ethnic
conflicts.  It  also  ended  the  administration’s  ability  to  utilize  a  tactic  of  Assertive
Multilateralism.25
14 The key components that had made an assertive multilateral tactic a success in the 1991
Gulf War were absent in the design of the Somali mission. The planning was truncated;
the decision to deploy was based on emotion rather than pragmatism and the United
States did not retain control of the entire mission as the mission parameters were altered
to incorporate the ambitions of the United Nations’ Secretary General. These flaws within
the Somali mission contributed to the demise of Assertive Multilateralism as a viable
policy option for  the United States  as  their  impact  was irrevocably tied to domestic
politics. 
 
 1.2 The Impact of Domestic politics 
15 Flaws in the Somali  mission plan were not sufficient to end the U.S.  commitment to
Assertive Multilateralism. These problems were exacerbated by the failure of the Bush
and Clinton Administrations to prioritize the challenges in Somalia and instead, focus on
domestic issues. For Bush, this entailed reducing his focus on foreign affairs as he sought
re-election during a recession. Following his failed re-election bid Bush was determined
to demonstrate benevolence during the interregnum that extended to the Somali people
but  not  necessarily  to  the  incoming  administration.  For  the  Clinton  Administration,
Somalia was seen as a problem to be dealt with by the Deputies Committee of the National
Security Council and kept away from the president. Madeleine Albright could advocate
Assertive Multilateralism, but the White House had domestic priorities. This created a
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self-perpetuating situation; inattention to the Somali mission due to a focus on domestic
priorities  contributed to American fatalities.  This tragedy then ensured that  political
adversaries were able to exploit the Somali debacle for their own ends and derail the
administration’s domestic policy programs.
16 The first domestic challenge to the continuation of Assertive Multilateralism arose during
the presidential election of 1992. President George H.W. Bush benefited greatly from his
implementation of an assertive multilateral approach to the 1991 Gulf War, securing not
only a military victory, but also an approval rating of 90%.26 This caused senior Democrats
to avoid the upcoming election, increasing his hopes for a second term. By 1992, however,
the American economy was in recession.Bush’s decision to raise taxes ensured he faced a
challenge not only from the Democratic Party, but also from the right of the Republican
Party by Pat Buchanan,  forcing Bush to adopt a far less internationalist  approach to
secure the nomination. The Clinton campaign focused on the economy, campaigning to
Bush’s left on domestic matters and to his right on foreign affairs.27 Assailed from left and
right, the president appeared indecisive. The campaign sought to “blunt Bush’s advantage
on [foreign  affairs]  and  in  boxing  terms,  keep  a  left  jab  in  his  face,”  ensuring  that
President Bush was so worried about being seen as a foreign policy president, “he failed
to take advantage of his strengths.”28
17 These factors ensured that calls for the United States to intervene in Somalia throughout
1992 went unheeded until after the election. It was the misfortune of the Somali people to
be suffering at a time when President Bush could ill-afford to demonstrate compassion
for  foreign  nationals.  Only  after  his  defeat  did  President  Bush  declare  the  Somali
deployment,  “necessary  to  address  a  major  humanitarian calamity  and avert  related
threats  to  international  peace and security  and protect  the safety  of  Americans  and
others  engaged  in  relief  operations.”29 Left  unexplained  was  the  timing  of  the
deployment,  which  international  agencies  and  members  of  Congress  had  requested
throughout  1992.30 Having allowed the  issue  to  drift  and deteriorate  throughout  the
election,  the White House acted only once the president  was beyond the will  of  the
electorate, ensuring the deployment was “a major intervention, undertaken by a lame-
duck  president,  with out  congressional  authority  and  not  in  response  to  a  local
invitation.”31 By failing to secure a viable exit  strategy,  President Bush inadvertently
provided  the  conditions  for  political  disaster  and  an  end  to  bi-partisan  support  for
Assertive Multilateralism. This was exacerbated by a presidential transition that has, in
retrospect, been viewed as one the most disorganized in U.S. history.
18 Having called for a more pro-active U.S. foreign policy throughout the campaign, there
was little that President-Elect Clinton could say in opposition to Bush’s plans.32 Bush and
Clinton discussed the Somali operation once during the transition, whilst Bush’s National
Security Adviser,  Brent Scowcroft kept in touch with Sandy Berger,  head of Clintons’
foreign policy transition team. However, there was no mutual formulation of policy and
no one was asking the Clinton team for ideas or approval.33 The failure of the incoming
and outgoing administrations to agree on the scope of the mission and on exit strategies
did much to undermine the continued utilization of Assertive Multilateralism once the
mission  faltered.  Once  this  occurred,  the  lack  of  attention  afforded  by  both
administrations  to  the  deployment  became  all  the  more  apparent.  The  Bush
Administration’s decision to intervene in Somalia was agreed at the Deputies Committee
of  the  National  Security  Council,  a  process  that  continued  under  the  Clinton
Administration as the Deputies Committee, rather than the full National Security Council,
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oversaw events in Somalia.34 There was no Principals Meetings on Somalia until tragedy
had struck because “the operation seemed to be going well. The mission seemed to be on
track for transfer to the U.N., with U.S. forces scheduled to be out by early to mid-1994.”35
This ensured that Cabinet-level officials were “not sufficiently attentive”36 to the Somali
operation and that President Clinton was removed from the policymaking process in the
initial  stages  of  the  deployment.  This  reinforced  a  view  of  the  president  as  being
inattentive to foreign policy and involved only in domestic political affairs.  
19 During the summer of 1993 the Clinton Administration was preparing its health care
reform plans, as designed by a committee headed by the First Lady, Hillary Clinton. Her
involvement ensured that  this  was both political  and personal,  and any crisis  risked
diverting attention from this flagship agenda.37 Accordingly, Clinton’s domestic advisers
were clear on what they wanted the foreign policy team to do with Somalia: “Hand over
the job of keeping order to a United Nations peacekeeping force, soon.”38 This reflected
the real focus of the administration, which did not lie in the Horn of Africa, but rather in
implementing domestic legislation, especially the First Lady’s health care reforms. The
White House was adamant that nothing should impede this, and certainly not a foreign
policy initiative inherited from the previous administration. This was placed at risk when,
having  withdrawn  20,000  troops  from  Somalia,  President  Clinton  acquiesced  to  the
recommendation  of  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs,  Colin  Powell, and  the  Deputies
Committee to deploy Task Force Ranger to Somalia to prevent further losses to the U.N.
detachment.39 Once more, a rapid decision, made at a sub-Cabinet level drew American
forces  deeper  into  a  land  where  U.S.  interests  were  impossible  to  define  and  in  an
operation that had nothing to do with the administration’s priorities. President Clinton’s
anger at the subsequent U.S. deaths in Somalia reflected his realization that the incident
threatened to dominate the news to the detriment of his health care proposals and his
entire  presidency.40 President  Clinton’s  fears  were  realized  in  a  TIME/CNN  poll  that
indicated only 43% support for a continued U.S. presence in Somalia, down from 79% in
January 1993.41 As the American death toll climbed, public support for the mission waned.
The  American public’s  regard  for  the  Clinton Administration’s  overall  foreign policy
suffered from the events in Somalia, as approval ratings tumbled to 34%.42 Americans
viewed the  Somali  mission as  a  repeat  of  the  1982 intervention in  Beirut  –  another
operation to keep a peace that did not exist.
20 The Bush and Clinton Administrations failed to prioritize the Somali mission and instead,
focused on domestic issues relating to elections and presidential legacies.43 The lack of
adequate  policy  coordination  during  the  interregnum exacerbated  this,  meaning  the
Clinton team inherited a challenge to their efforts to enact health care reform. Until the
morning of October 3, 1993 the Somali operation was on track as far as the Americans
were concerned. One tragic event caused a shift  in U.S.  foreign policy that had been
initiated by a president of one party and continued by the president of another. The
Clinton Administration had advocated a pro-active policy of Assertive Multilateralism but
the  events  in  Somalia  demonstrated  “a  cavernous  gap  between  the  administration’s
soaring rhetoric and its much more judicious actions.”44
 
1.3 Inability to Control the Mission Narrative 
21 Due to the timing of the mission, the Somali operation fell between two administrations
and as such there was a lack of commitment to the cause in the Clinton White House. The
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inability of the White House to control the narrative in Somalia and to counter criticism
of the mission, proved to be a serious impediment to the continued viability of Assertive
Multilateralism. It had not been a campaign priority and threatened to divert attention
from the domestic agenda. A fundamental problem for the Clinton Administration was
that  the  Bush  White  House  presented  the  mission  as  a  simple  one  of  humanitarian
necessity.  However,  Operation  Restore  Hope  was  a  far  more  complex  and  perilous
undertaking than was conveyed to the American public.45 Once Operation Restore Hope
(U.N.I.T.A.F.) was ended and the majority of U.S. troops returned home, the American
public, and indeed many in the White House forgot about Somalia. After the handover of
control  in  May  1993,  President  Clinton  welcomed  home  a  number  of  American
servicemen at a ceremony on the White House lawn, telling his troops, “You have proved
that American leadership can help to mobilize international action to create a better
world.”46 Whilst the event was intended to honour the troops, the administration also
sought to project Bill Clinton as a credible Commander-in-Chief. It was also part of the
mission  narrative:  U.S.  troops  had  deployed,  delivered  aid  and  returned  within  six
months. However, once the Special Forces were ordered into Somalia in August with the
ensuing fatalities, the narrative became more difficult to explain. Instead of successfully
portraying the U.N. mission and the U.S. Ranger deployment as two distinct elements, the
lines became blurred. The White House was unable to convey the narrative of these two
distinct missions, one of relief and the other, reciprocity, ensuring that the true nature of
American  intentions  was  called  into  question,  along  with  the  competence  of  the
administration. 
22 The  deaths  caused  the  House  Appropriations  Committee  moved  to  impede  future
humanitarian operations by demanding that presidents give fifteen days notice before
dispatching troops and provide estimated costs, projected duration, the goals and defined
U.S. interest. These moves, by a Democratically controlled Congress, reinforced growing
concerns about President Clinton’s ability to serve as Commander-in-Chief.   President
Clinton was in the difficult situation of having to address and rectify mistakes made by
both his own team and by members of the Bush Administration. “The Somalia tragedy
shocked Clinton into talking control of his foreign policy and his bureaucracy.”47 Clinton
ordered all U.S. troops out of Somalia by March 31, 1994 and dispatched a contingent of
1,700 troops to Somalia  to  facilitate  the withdrawal.  As  Anthony Lake conceded,  the
decision made itself: “To do otherwise would have made it open season on Americans
around the world. The potential message: Kill and humiliate our people and the United
States  will  immediately  retreat.”48 The  President’s  decision  prevented  a  revolt  in
Congress,  where legislators  welcomed the firm deadline for  withdrawal,  which many
viewed as a declaration of independence from the U.N.,  its Secretary General and his
policy  of  Nation  Building.  The  notion  of  blaming  the  incident  on  the  U.N.  became
doctrinal, as the administration and members of Congress implicated Boutros-Ghali. Yet
despite assurances that U.S. troops would never again be placed under U.N. command, all
involved knew that Task Force Ranger had been under direct U.S. command at all times.
The top U.N. official in Somalia was an American, and it was he, Admiral Howe, who most
sought the deployment of Task Force Ranger to Mogadishu. There was no escaping the
fact that “Task Force Ranger was a wholly American production.”49
23 The administration’s  inability  to  control  the mission narrative was  exacerbated by a
deliberate distortion of events and intentions, as the Somalia mission and the attending
tactic of Assertive Multilateralism were utilized by Clinton’s opponents in their effort to
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regain the White House. The Somali debacle contributed to the Republican victory in the
1994  mid-term elections  and  the  new Senate  Majority  Leader,  Bob  Dole,  focused  on
foreign policy in his bid to defeat Clinton in the 1996 Presidential election. He claimed
that under Clinton, “U.S. foreign policy [had] been marked by inconsistency, incoherence,
lack of  purpose,  and a  reluctance to  lead.”  To Dole,  the  choice  was  stark,  “to  allow
international  organizations  to  call  the  shots  as  in  Somalia,  or  to  make  multilateral
groupings work for American interests, as in Operation Desert Storm.”50 This effort to re-
write history by removing mention of the Bush Administration and blurring the sequence
of events in 1993 became a mantra for critics of Assertive Multilateralism, which included
former presidents. George H.W. Bush noted, “After I left office the mission changed into
trying to bring the Somali warlords to justice. It was classic mission creep...When the
starvation  was  ended,  we  should  have  brought  our  troops  home  and  let  the  U.N.
peacekeeping force take over.”51 What the Clinton Administration failed to convey was
that this is precisely what happened. 20,000 U.S. troops had left Somalia on schedule,
leaving 1,100 troops under a U.N. rapid reaction team and 3,000 support personnel. Only
when the safety of  the U.N.  mission was called into question was Task Force Ranger
dispatched. Like Bush, Richard Nixon described the mission in Somalia as being “a lesson
in how not to conduct U.S. foreign policy,” and insisted that America should discern a
way of “using the U.N. not being used by it.”52 Nixon’s former secretary of state, Henry
Kissinger  noted,  “the  new  Clinton  Administration  reduced  the  number  of  American
troops from 28,000 to 4,000…as a result of the new mission, a battle took place, costing a
score of American lives.”53 However, neither Nixon nor Kissinger accurately addressed
the situation. The U.S. commitment to U.N.O.S.O.M. II was minimal, most U.S troops had
withdrawn once the U.N. took control of the mission and the events of October 3 had
occurred  in  a  bid  to  apprehend  forces  that  had  murdered  U.N.  troops.  This  was  a
distinction lost on many, including the former president and his secretary of state, as well
as  those in Congress  who had initially  voted in favor of  the U.N.O.S.O.M.  II  mission.
Former Clinton adviser Michael Mandelbaum noted, “Whoever won the election in 1992
would have had to face a tough choice in 1993 regarding Somalia…The Bush people might
have made a different choice than Clinton, and just pulled out, but they can’t now say
that they could have avoided that choice.”54 When President Clinton responded to the
Bush criticism he clearly had to restrain himself. “It may have been naive for anyone to
seriously assert in the beginning you could go into a situation as politically and militarily
charged as that one, give people food, turn around and leave, and expect everything to be
hunky-dory.”55
 
1.4 Key Implications 
24 The  Somali  mission  had  implications  not  only  for  politics  and  policy,  but  also  for
personnel and operations. It was recognized that “the scale of the foreign policy reversals
in  Somalia  destroyed the  administration’s  willingness  to  pursue  foreign policy goals
aggressively.”56 It led to a change in philosophy at the White House and destroyed the
administration’s capacity to advocate an approach of Assertive Multilateralism in the
future. Just as President Bush had delayed a deployment due to the 1992 election cycle, so
too did the 1994 and 1996 elections impact the administration’s thinking as it sought to
extract itself from Somalia. The policy response to the Somali mission and the attendant
concept of Assertive Multilateralism took the form of Presidential Decision Directive 25:
‘Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.’ (PDD-25) Delivered to the president in May
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1994, this was the first comprehensive policy on multilateral peace operations in the
post-Cold  War  era.  It  developed  new standards  to  determine  future  participation  in
peacekeeping operations and restated the importance of Congressional support for such
missions. The report concluded that whilst peacekeeping should remain a component of
U.S.  foreign  policy,  it  would  be  “a  part  of  our  national  security  strategy,  not  the
centrepiece.”57 Early  drafts  of  this  document  had  considered  an  expansion  of  U.N.
operations  with  the  U.S.  being  committed  to  support  such  engagements  militarily,
economically and politically as well as support for a standing U.N. army and the placing
of U.S. forces under United Nations’ command. Such policies became politically untenable
following the events in Somalia, which caused a re-write that clarified the position of the
administration  with  regard  to  command  and  control  of  American  forces  in  U.N.
operations:  “The  President  will  never  relinquish  command  of  U.S.  forces.  That  is
inviolable.”58 The Somalia mission “interrupted an important policy debate upon the use
of  peacekeeping  troops  in  operations.  People  had  been  very  enthusiastic  about  the
concept but it was seen as a bad idea after Somalia, and there was a pulling back from this
idea from that point onwards.”59 A State Department official said “We’ll get back to it at
some point and hopefully some sort of concept of collaborative action with the U.N. will
emerge, but it is not going to be what it was.”60 Despite this hopeful assertion, U.S. policy
towards  the  United  Nations  failed  to  recover  from  the  incident  and  resulted  in  a
relationship of  mutual  suspicion that still  endures.  The divisions between the United
Nations and the United States that became apparent during the administration of George
W. Bush, over issues of rendition and the war in Iraq, had their origins, therefore, in the
early years of the Clinton era.61
25 The  fallout  from Somalia  impacted  not  only  the  philosophical  embrace  of  Assertive
Multilateralism but also the administration’s capacity to engage overseas in any form of
multilateral action. “The events in Somalia created on over-hang that was a consistent
reminder in other events…It provided a realization that future losses or casualties would
produce a response in Congress similar to that provided by the events in Mogadishu.”62
The crisis and the Congressional reaction ensured that President Clinton was initially
unable to recommend a deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia under a U.N. peacekeeping
role, for fear of crossing “the Mogadishu Line”63. Just as Somalis had suffered throughout
1992, the suffering in Bosnia continued due to the repercussions of perceived failings in
U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, the fallout from Somalia coincided with the massacres in
Rwanda, as the U.N. plan to send 5,500 troops to alleviate the situation was vetoed by
Madeline Albright, operating under instructions from Washington. Despite protests from
the White House that the plan had received limited support from other nations,  the
reality was that “it was politically impossible to go into central Africa” following the
events in Somalia.64 Indeed, the publication of PDD-25 was a tacit admission that whilst
the Clinton Administration may have wanted to solve the world’s problems, neither the
United States nor the international community had the resources or the mandate to do
so. Nancy Soderberg noted, “After Somali there was just no enthusiasm for putting troops
on the ground anywhere. I think it delayed aggressive engagement in Bosnia, it certainly
delayed any response in Rwanda, but I don’t think we ever really stepped away from
multilateralism, it was more a question of assessing where multilateralism worked and
where it didn’t work.”65 Involvement in future peacekeeping operations required that
vital national or allied interests be at stake and that a clear commitment to win existed.
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“Peacekeeping is not at the center of our foreign or defense policies,”66 Anthony Lake
asserted in February 1994, reversing the administration’s initial policy.  
 
1.5 Conclusion
26 Assertive  Multilateralism  appeared  to  offer  the  domestically  focused  Clinton
administration a method by which to address economic renewal whilst  still  adopting
what it viewed as a bi-partisan approach to maintaining a global presence. The Clinton
Administration saw this  as  a  way to  spread expenditure,  casualties  and the focus  of
hostility away from the United States and on to the shoulders of a global organization
that had the potential to live up to its mandate in the post-Cold War era. However, this
was predicated on the false belief that the American people would tolerate casualties in
distant lands when no national interest was at stake and that Congress would continue its
Cold War era support of the president in matters of world affairs. Neither assumption
proved  to  be  viable  as the  administration’s  efforts  to  initiate  a  policy  of  Assertive
Multilateralism met Congressional opposition in the face of public dismay over the deaths
in Somalia. Somalia proved to be the start of a new decade of conflict as bitter infighting,
civil  wars  and  intra-national  conflicts  dominated  the  1990s.  Rather  than  reinforcing
American efforts to export human rights and to engage in conflict resolution, the events
in Somalia served to convince Americans that such internal disputes were of no concern
to the world’s sole superpower. The Somali mission lacked a clear objective beyond its
initial intervention, something Anthony Lake recognized only in retrospect: “In 1993 we
in the Clinton Administration inherited a situation without a strategy or a timetable. And
sadly, as we struggled with key issues, we probably made an ill-defined mission worse.”67
27 President Clinton may have sought to define a new foreign policy for a new geopolitical
age, but his willingness to delegate foreign policy to his advisers, whilst he focused on the
domestic  policy,  reinforced the  perception that  he  was  disengaged from the  foreign
policy decision-making process. The debacle in Somalia blighted Clinton’s first year in
office. The initial deployment had worked as planned. It was only after American Special
Forces were dispatched, months after the initial deployment had been withdrawn, that
the decisive casualties were inflicted within a matter of hours. Had this not occurred,
Assertive Multilateralism may have been a far more viable option. It had not meant to
encapsulate the administration’s entire approach to foreign policy, but it had been the
approach with which to engage with the United Nations in multilateral  operations.68
Events  in  Somalia,  however,  confirmed President  Clinton’s  worst  fears  about  foreign
policy being “a murky business, outside the reach of domestic presidential control, with
greater possibility for negatives than positives, out of which relatively little good could
come.”69 President Clinton found that the world continued to impede on his time as “the
end of the Cold War heralded not an end to history but rather, a host of unexpected
threats,  some new and others ancient.”70 The entire political  establishment learnt an
important lesson; there would be no further deployment of ground forces to locations
where  U.S.  national  interest  did  not  exist  or  could  not  be  adequately  defined  –
peacekeeping operations were not considered a justifiable cause for American casualties.
The deaths of 18 American servicemen on 3 October 1993 proved to be instrumental in
ending  a  brief  era  of  bi-partisan  support  for  multilateral  operations  under  United
Nation’s mandates and caused the Clinton Administration to fundamentally reconsider its
commitment to the organization and to peacekeeping operations in general. 
A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (...
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 1 | 2012
12
NOTES
1. Interviews have been conducted with Anthony Lake (National Security Adviser 1993-1997),
Leon  Fuerth  (National  Security  Adviser  to  Vice  President  Gore  1993-2001),  Nancy  Soderberg
(Member of the National Security Council 1993-1996) and Morton Halperin (Pentagon 1993, NSC
1994). 
2. Richard Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), xi.
3. Michael  Dobbs,  Madeleine  Albright:  A  Twentieth  Century  Odyssey (New York:  Henry  Holt  and
Company, 1999), 349.
4. Madeleine Albright, Madame Secretary, A Memoir (London: Macmillan Press, 2003), 176.
5. Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace (New York: Random House, 1994), 32
6. Peter  W.  Rodman,  Director  of  National  Security  Programs,  Nixon  Center  for  Peace  and
Freedom, quoted in Steven Erlanger, “The U.S. and the U.N.; Now, Who Needs Whom More?” New
York Times, 7 July 1996, D5.
7. Madeleine  Albright,  “Myths  of  Peace-keeping,”  Statement  before  the  Subcommittee  on
International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1993, cited in U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 26 (24 June 1993),
464.
8. By  early  1992  Somalia  had  descended  into  anarchy  with  no  recognisable,  functioning
government or legal infrastructure. Foreign nationals were evacuated as up to 30,000 Somali’s
perished  from  malnutrition  and  conflict.  See  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  Committee  on
Foreign Affairs, Consideration of Miscellaneous Bills and Resolutions, Vol.2, 19 February 1992, 120.
9. For the official United Nations record on the mission, see United Nations Operation in Somalia
Mission Background, available at the United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/
unosomi.htm.  See  also  The  United  States  Army  in  Somalia, http://www.history.army.mil/
brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm 
10. See U.S. House of Representatives, Select committee on Hunger, Somalia: Case for Action, (22
July 1992); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa,
A Review of U.S. Policy and Current Events in Kenya, Malawi, and Somalia (23 June, 1992). 
11. For the official United Nations record on this mission see Completed Peacekeeping Operations:
UNOSOM II, available at the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/
unosom2.htm.
12. President Nixon was re-elected despite the deaths of 20,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam in his first
term. 15 deaths convinced President Clinton to leave Somalia. See Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “Clinton
Administration Proving Reluctant World Cop,” The Washington Post, 17 October 1993.
13. George Bush, “Humanitarian Mission to Somalia,” Department of State Dispatch (4 December
1992)
14. See William J. Clinton, My Life (London: Hutchinson, 2004), 550 and Bruce W. Nelan, “Taking
on the Thugs,” Time Magazine, 140/24, 14 December 1992, 26.
15. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 565.
16. Martin Fletcher, “U.S. Troops Ready to Land in Mogadishu,” The Times, 2 December 1992, 12.
17. Congress did not approve the Somali mission until after Bush left office. The Senate voted to
approve on 4 February 1993 and the House voted in favour on 25 May 1993. 
18. See  Lee  H.  Hamilton  with  Jordan  Tama,  A  Creative  Tension:  The  Foreign  Policy  Roles  of  the
President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2002), 27.
A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (...
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 1 | 2012
13
19. Anthony  Lake  served  as  National  Security  Adviser  (1993-1997).  Berger  served  as  Deputy
National Security Adviser (1993-1997) and National Security Adviser (1997-2001).
20. David Halberstam, War In A Time Of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York; Scribner,
2001), 254.
21. The White House was happy to offer support for the nation building exercise but nothing
more: “The process of nation building in Somalia will take some time…we owe it to ourselves –
and  to  Somalia  –  to  help  UNSCOM  succeed.”  See  Peter  Tarnoff,  “U.S.  Policy  in  Somalia,”
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 29 July 1993, cited in U.S. Department of
State Dispatch 4, no.32, 9 August 1993, 23-24. 
22. George J. Church, ‘Anatomy of a Disaster,’ Time Magazine 142/16, 18 October 1993, 40. 
23. Due to the prevalence of regional clans, the viability of developing a functioning state in
Somalia  was  always  going to  be  a  challenge.  See  I.M.  Lewis,  Somali  Culture,  History  and  Social
Institutions (London:  London School  of  Economics  and Political  Science,  1981)  and Richard H.
Shultz,  Jr.,  “State  Disintegration  and  Ethnic  Conflict:  A  Framework  for  Analysis,”  in  Annals
(September 1995), 75-88.
24. Public  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  William  J.  Clinton,  vol.1  (1993),  Message  to  the  Congress
Transmitting a Report on Somalia, 13 October 1993, 1740. 
25. Thomas Omestad, “Foreign Policy and Campaign ‘96,” Foreign Policy 105 (Winter 1996/1997)
43.
26. Halberstam, War In A Time Of Peace,9.
27. See E.J. Dionne, “Clinton Turns Sights to Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, 29 July 1992, A1.
28. Author’s interview with Anthony Lake, 14 September 2004.
29. President  George  H.W.  Bush,  Letter  to  Congressional  Leaders  on  the  Situation  in  Somalia, 10
December1992.
30. In June 1992 a bi-partisan group of eighty-eight members of Congress urged the president to
make relief  efforts in Somalia his ‘highest priority,’  see U.S.  House of Representatives:  Select
Committee on Hunger, Somalia: Case for Action (22 July, 1992), 85-87.
31. William G. Hyland, Clinton’s  World:  Remaking American Foreign Policy (Westport,  CT: Praeger
Press, 1999), 53.
32. See John M. Goshko,  “U.N.  Orders U.S.-Led Military Force in Somalia,”  Washington Post, 4
December 1992, A1.
33. Bush’s national security adviser Bent Scowcroft advised Nancy Soderberg “Don’t worry. We’ll
have the troops out by January 20.” Soderberg, The Superpower Myth, 36.
34. Author’s interview with Leon Fuerth, 8 June 2004. By 3 October 1993 the NSC had held 38
Principal  Committee  Meetings  (none  of  which  had  addressed  Somalia)  and  60  Deputies
Committee meetings (9 of which had addressed Somalia).  
35. Soderberg, The Superpower Myth, 38.
36. Warren  Christopher,  quoted  in  Michael  R.  Gordon  with  John  H.  Cushman  Jr.  “After
Supporting Hunt for Aidid, U.S. Is Blaming U.N. for Losses,” New York Times, 18 October 1993, A1.
37. The Health Care Bill was sent to the Hill on 27 October 1993, with momentum having been
lost when the president had to deal with the death of the soldiers in Somalia.
38. George J. Church, “His Seven Most Urgent Decisions,” Time Magazine 141/4, 25 January 1993,
20.
39. Gordon with Cushman Jr. “After Supporting Hunt for Aidid, U.S. Is Blaming U.N. for Losses,”
A1.
40. The president reportedly exploded, “I can’t believe we’re being pushed around by these two-
bit pricks.” See George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human, A Political Education (New York: Little and
Brown, 1999), 214.
41. J.F.O. McAllister, “When to Go, When to Stay,” Time Magazine 142/14, 4 October 1993, 40. 
A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (...
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 1 | 2012
14
42. Gallup Poll, November, 1993, quoted in Diane Hollern Harvey, “The Public’s View of Clinton,”
in The Post-Modern Presidency: Bill Clinton’s Legacy in U.S. Politics, ed. Steven E. Schier (Pittsburgh,
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 128.
43. An internal Clinton Administration report concluded “the policy had been largely left in the
hands of midlevel officials as it shifted from a humanitarian mission…towards a military effort…
While Lake had kept the president informed…the principles never sat down among themselves,
or with the president, to review the shift.” See Soderberg, The Superpower Myth, 36.
44. Jonathan Clarke,  “Contempt for Foreign Policy is  Showing,” Los Angeles  Times, 26 October
1993, B7.
45. Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute
of Peace Press, 1994) 
46. George J. Church, “Somalia, Mission Half Accomplished,” Time Magazine 141/20, 17 May 1993,
42.
47. Soderberg, The Superpower Myth, 40
48. Anthony Lake, Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them
(Boston: Little, Brown, 2000), 129.
49. See  Walter  Clarke  and  Jeffrey  Herbst,  “Somalia  and  the  Future  of  Humanitarian
Intervention,”  Foreign  Affairs 75  (March-April  1996),  73  and  Mark  Bowden,  Black  Hawk  Down
(London: Bantam, Press, 1999), 487.
50. Bob Dole, “Shaping America’s Global Future,” Foreign Policy, Issue 98, (Spring 1995) 35.
51. George  Bush,  “ All  The  Best,  George  Bush”:  My  Life  in  Letters  and  Other  Writings  (New York:
Scribner, 1999), 580.
52. Nixon, Beyond Peace, 36
53. Henry Kissinger, Does American Need A Foreign Policy? Towards A Diplomacy for the Twenty-First
Century (New York: Simon Schuster, 2001), 266.
54. Thomas L. Friedman, “A Broken Truce: Clinton vs. Bush In Global Policy,” New York Times, 17
October 1993, A1.
55. Public Papers of the Presidents, William J. Clinton, vol. 2 (1993), 1753.
56. James  Adams, “Clinton  Foreign  Policyin  Tatters,”  Sunday  Times, 17  October 1993,  Overseas
Section.
57. Lake, Six Nightmares, 153.
58. Press Briefing by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Director of Strategic Plans and
Policy General Wesley Clarke, The White House, 5 May 1994.
59. Author’s interview with Morton Halperin, 22 June 2004.
60. Gordon with Friedman, “Details of U.S. Raid in Somalia: Success So Near, a Loss So Deep,” A1.
61. James D. Boys, “What’s So Extraordinary About Rendition?” The International Journal of Human
Rights, 15/4, May 2011, 591.
62. Author’s Interview With Leon Fuerth, June 8, 2004
63. Clarke and Herbert, “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention”, 70.
64. Mike Sheehan, military adviser to Madeleine Albright, quoted in Dobbs, Madeleine Albright: A
Twentieth Century Odyssey, 356.
65. Author’s Interview With Nancy Soderberg, 26 May 2004.
66. Anthony Lake, ‘The Limits of Peacekeeping,’ New York Times, 6 February 1994, Sec IV, 17.
67. Lake, Six Nightmares, 166.
68. Author’s Interview With Nancy Soderberg, 26 May 2004.
69. Halberstam, War In A Time Of Peace, 264.
70. Sidney Blumenthal,  The Clinton Wars:  An Insider’s  Account of  the White  House Years (London:
Penguin Books, 2003), 60.
A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (...
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 1 | 2012
15
INDEX




Senior Visiting Research FellowKing’s College London Associate ProfessorRichmond University
London
A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (...
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 1 | 2012
16
